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Redefining ‘Tradition’ in Political Thought1 
Humeira Iqtidar 
King’s College London 
 
Abstract 
Debates about preserving, modifying and applying sharia (Islamic normative guidelines) 
through principles of taqlid (to follow) or ijtihad (to carry out independent interpretation) are 
immensely useful in thinking through a sharper definition of tradition for political theorists 
and historians of political thought more generally. Political theorists and historians of 
political thought have tended to use tradition in a range of ways without specifying key 
elements of the concept. Building on debates in Islamic thought related to taqlid and its 
relationship to ijtihad, and through a focus on the ideas of a contemporary thinker, Javed 
Ahmed Ghamidi, this paper proposes that tradition in political thought can be defined as a 
framework for knowledge production and consumption constituted of two key elements: 
method and sensibility.  Further, the paper suggests that this definition allows us a better 
understanding of vibrancy in a tradition: vehement debate, contradictions and internal 
contestation are not signs of decay but of vitality within a tradition. It is the severe delinking 
of the two elements of a tradition, method and sensibility, which has greater potential to 
reduce its vibrancy.  	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Introduction 
While the term tradition is widely used by political theorists and historians of political 
thought, its key components remain under-conceptualized. From Arendt’s (2002) subtle 
discussion of Marx’s place within the tradition of Western political thought, to Pocock’s 
(2003) interest in tracing the influence of Machiavelli’s ideas on Anglo-American 
republicanism, to Runciman’s (2001) insightful analysis of the methodological arguments 
within the field of the history of political thought, few have stopped to define precisely what 
they mean by tradition, assuming it to be a self-explanatory term. Alasdair MacIntyre (1981, 
1990) one of the key figures in Anglo-American philosophy who has taken the idea of 
tradition seriously, provides us very good reasons for thinking about traditions, about how 
fragmented lineages may still carry force, and most critically, how critics of a tradition might 
hope to make their arguments meaningful to its adherents. Yet he too neglects to define 
tradition concretely. Thus, tradition has been used rather broadly to mean a range of things 
including the longevity of particular ideas, the lineage of modes of thinking and the 
provenance of ideas.  
Curiously, these notions undergo a transformation when we turn to Euro-American 
academic study of Islam. Here, the concept of tradition has been used in an entirely different 
way by placing it in tension with modernity and reform. In this case, it becomes an entirely 
historical and normative concept. Rather than using a differently inflected meaning of 
tradition when engaging with Islamic thought, I suggest that debates within Islamic political 
thought provide important conceptual means for defining tradition more concretely for 
historians of political thought: tradition may be best defined as a framework of knowledge 
production and consumption comprised of two main elements: method, i.e., a particular way 
of doing things, making arguments, using resources, organizing thought, interpreting texts, as 
well as performing rituals or practices; and a sensibility, i.e., a philosophical approach as well 
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as the particular subjectivities tied to that philosophy. This definition builds on the debates 
about taqlid  (to follow) and its relationship to ijtihad  (to carry out independent 
interpretation) in Islamic thought that I shall detail in the first section. Many revivalists and 
orientalists have argued against taqlid, viewing it primarily as a set of rituals and practices 
that Muslims have followed unthinkingly for centuries. They have advocated greater reliance 
on ijtihad to liberate the ‘spirit’ of Islam from the deadweight of out-dated rituals, as well as 
from methodological norms of working within the defined schools of sharia2 interpretation 
for moral guidance that are key to the practice of taqlid. I go on to examine the thought of a 
popular and influential public intellectual, Javed Ahmed Ghamidi, and some of the debates 
generated by his ideas. Unlike a previous generation of Muslim modernists, Ghamidi has 
privileged a dramatic emphasis on method in his attempt at reinvigorating the Islamic 
tradition by establishing strict criteria for interpreting sharia that include a significant disdain 
for earlier interpretive works. Through a focus on his thought and building on the discussion 
on taqlid, I argue that vibrancy within a tradition is generated through a constant calibration 
of method and sensibility. When and if the matter is settled too dramatically in favour of one 
or the other, or if method is separated markedly from the sensibility, then we can expect a 
reduction of debate and hence vibrancy within the tradition. Ghamidi’s emphasis on a strict 
method for interpreting the Quran without recourse to the vast corpus of older interpretive 
literature and debates, results in a less capacious sensibility, reducing the scope for diversity 
in thought and practice.  
In the last three decades Javed Ahmed Ghamidi has emerged as a prominent thinker 
and public intellectual, not just within Pakistan, but also at an international level, hailed in an 
American newspaper as ‘a bit of a rock star -- adored, hated, popular, and notorious all at 
once’3.  As a prominent scholar of the Quran he brings together religious learning with a wide 
accessibility in his role as a public intellectual. Currently in exile, due ostensibly to his liberal 
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and tolerant views that have excited extremist responses, Ghamidi continues to play an 
important role in contemporary Islamic intellectual debates, particularly in urban Pakistan’s 
public sphere through his publishing (including the journals Ishraq in Urdu and Renaissance 
in English), TV show, research and teaching institute (al-Mawrid) and school system 
(Mus‘ab schools).   
However, attempts at classifying Ghamidi’s thought raises interesting challenges: he 
has been called a ‘critical traditionalist’ (Masud, 2007:356) but also a ‘liberal reformer’ 
(Yasmin, 2012: 177). This places him in directly oppositional categories within the dominant 
Western academic framework of classifying Islamic thought, in which tradition and reform 
continue to frame a binary4. These challenges are productive in exploring the changing 
political valence of the idea of tradition in the contemporary politico-intellectual context of 
the ongoing war on/of terror, and raise important considerations in tracing the contours of 
revivalism in contemporary Islamic thought. I suggest that a previous schema of associating 
reform with Muslim modernists, and stagnation or resistance with traditional or traditionalist 
thinkers, is particularly redundant in the face of a new generation of scholars who are keen to 
be defined as traditionalists or at least as being closely bound to the tradition. Revivalism in 
modern Islamic tradition, I suggest here, has been primarily concerned with calibration of 
method and sensibility, some revivalists privileging one and some the other of these two key 
constituents of tradition. More critically then, these debates allow greater depth to our 
understanding of vibrancy within a tradition. 
 
Taqlid, Ijtihad and Modern Islamic Thought  
Scholars of Euro-American political thought speak easily of the Western tradition, or the 
liberal or Marxist traditions. However, as soon as we turn our focus to Islamic political 
thought, as well as most other non-Western thought, chameleon-like, the term “tradition” 
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changes meaning. Tradition takes on stageist connotations, and in the Euro-American 
academic study of Islamic thought it is defined primarily in relation to the ideas of 
‘modernity’ or ‘reform’: on this reading, the Islamic tradition is inevitably too traditional.  
In fact, the idea of ‘tradition’ has a complex and important history in Islamic thought, 
which is useful to consider separately from the Western academic study of Islam. Classical 
Islamic thought is immensely self-conscious about being a tradition, in terms of knowledge 
production and consumption, with long running debates on the method and the sensibility 
that are contained within it. For instance, there is great emphasis on both a method and 
sensibility for recording and judging the hadith (sayings of the Prophet) and sunna (life of the 
Prophet and his companions) as they are seen to provide exemplary guidance to the question 
of the good life. In terms of method, there is an emphasis on establishing how the sunnan and 
ahadith (sing. hadith) are recorded, which accounts can be deemed reliable, who recounted 
them and to whom, how precisely might these be interpreted. In terms of sensibility there is 
an interest in establishing the philosophical basis for using hadith or sunna and working 
through their role in producing specific subjectivities and social realities. All of this has 
received a lot of attention in Islamic philosophical and juridical literature precisely because of 
the interest in fusing both the method and the sensibility, practice and philosophy. Indeed, in 
the Islamic context juridical and philosophical literature often overlaps considerably since 
questions of practice in particular social contexts are linked inextricably to questions of 
philosophical premises, and recognized explicitly as such.  
 Two important concepts that bring this aspect of tradition to the fore are taqlid and 
ijtihad. Ijtihad is independent interpretation of the Quran, and since the early 20th century has 
been seen as a panacea to the purported stagnation of Islamic thought. Here, I shall focus 
more on taqlid not just to highlight the ways in which it is misunderstood, but also because it 
is in the details of its misinterpretation that we find important clues for thinking about the 
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question of tradition. Taqlid is a conscious decision, both by the scholar and the lay person, 
about which mujtahid (innovative or creative interpreter), or mazhab (philosophical school)5 
to follow in defining what makes a good Muslim life. In his pioneering work, Hallaq has 
argued persuasively that the consolidation of taqlid as an important element of Muslim life 
was meant primarily as a way for the different scholars and jurists to anchor their own 
reasoning (Hallaq, 2009: 110-113) as well as a way to separate out the mujtahids—those who 
have the intellectual and spiritual ability to innovate—from other scholars (Hallaq, 2009: 75). 
Different classical scholars supported varying versions of taqlid, from ‘following the opinion’ 
to ‘following the person’. For instance, the 13th century scholar Al-Amidi (d. 631 AH/1233 
CE) favoured following the person, i.e. the scholar, because he argued that while thought and 
reflection are universal to all human beings, the average person may find it hard to assess the 
weight of evidence behind each opinion, but may still be able to discern more readily 
between a more learned authority than a less learned scholar (Rahman, 1965:161). Contrary 
to the claims of orientalist scholars who have seen taqlid as a kind of blind following, 
whether of established schools of jurisprudence or of particular rituals only, it is useful to 
recognize that for the average believing Muslim, in theory at least, the choice about which 
scholar to follow to ground one’s ethical behaviour is an open one, but one that carries within 
it an active recognition of the method (eg. how to use particular resources such as ahadith) as 
well as philosophical sensibility (e.g. what ethical goals are of primary importance) of 
individual scholars as well as of the different philosophical schools or mazahib (sing. 
mazhab). Taqlid then is not just about ritual but also about philosophy, not just method but 
also sensibility. One important advantage of taqlid has been that it allowed sometimes 
opposing, and often very different ways of being Muslim to be equally valid (Rahman 1961: 
163; Hallaq, 2013; Jackson, 1996; Rapaport 2003). This capaciousness, as well as a lack of 
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reliance on state imposition, has allowed sharia as Islamic legal and moral guidance immense 
entrenchment in social life (Hallaq, 2013).  
From the Islamic sixth (and Christian twelfth) century taqlid has been more 
prominent in Islamic juridical literature and practice, but ijtihad too has been continuously 
invoked even if it did not dominate. Taqlid allowed predictability and flexibility at the same 
time. Providing predictable responses based on the sensiblity and method of each mazhab 
allowed significant social stability. At the same time, given the diversity contained within the 
different mazahib or schools that were recognized as equally valid, ordinary Muslims were 
afforded significant choice and plasticity within sharia. Some schools became associated 
with particular activities e.g. sales of charitable endowments are often conducted under 
Hanbali mazhab because Hanbali interpretation allow for such sales while others do not 
support it. At the same time, it was possible for people who would ordinarily follow one 
school of interpretation to bring specific legal cases to another school’s courts. For instance, 
under Mamluk rule (659-923 AH/1261-1517 CE) the predominantly Hanafi military elite 
would take endowment sales cases to Hanbali courts (Rapoport, 2003:22). Indeed, even qadis 
or jurists could move from one mazhab to another (Rapoport, 2003:227) 
Paradoxically given this flexibility and capaciousness, taqlid had been translated by 
influential European scholars in terms of blind adherence to established norms or tradition, as 
“imitation,” (Coulson 1964: 80), “servile imitation,” (Makdisi 1981: 199) and “unquestioning 
acceptance” (Schacht 1964: 71).  Taqlid became associated with “intellectual timidity, and/or 
depletion of creative and interpretive energies” (Jackson, 1996: 170). European scholars and 
administrators built upon early modern, pre-colonial Islamic movements of reform and 
renewal such as those led by Ibn Wahab in Arabia and Shah Wali Ullah in India, both of 
whom criticized excessive reliance on taqlid. However, these Muslim scholars saw taqlid in a 
complementary relationship with creative interpretation or ijtihad (Dallal, 1993). Colonial 
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administrators incorporated that internal critique into a dramatically more sustained attack on 
taqlid itself. This attack was also inflected with their own conceptions of tradition. From the 
late 18th century, relying on an Enlightenment conception of tradition as unchanging and 
regressive, a conflation of tradition as blind adherence and taqlid as tradition was 
operationalized by colonial scholars/administrators in their policy decisions. In South Asia, 
such assumptions played a role in the homogenization, codification and ultimately stagnation 
of sharia that the British administrators carried out under the rubric of Anglo-Mohammaden 
with the aspiration to standardize. This codification led to the loss of precisely that internal 
diversity, even contradiction, that made sharia adaptable and alive, such that by the late 19th 
century, what was by then called Mohammedan law was seen by many urban Muslims too as 
stagnant (Kugle, 2001). Urban Muslim modernist reformers such as Sir Syed Ahmed Khan 
and Amir Ali6 appropriated and internalized this framing of taqlid and tradition. For instance, 
Amir Ali singled out taqlid for particular attack by arguing that “it is a common belief that 
since the four Imams no scholar has arisen qualified to interpret the laws of the Prophet. No 
account is taken of the altered circumstances in which Moslems are placed…They mixed up 
the temporary with the permanent and the universal with the particular” (cited in Binder 
1957: 387). The gulf between urban Muslims who were exposed most dramatically to 
‘Mohammedan’ law, and rural Muslims who continued with more localized sharia 
adjudication, was reflected by the early 20th century in calls for a dramatic transformation of 
taqlid amongst segments of urban Muslims. The immense creativity of Islamic thought since 
the late 19th century (Iqtidar, 2011:38-54) is structured precisely around these questions of 
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Tradition Across Disciplines 
The history of political thought has remained somewhat insulated from such debates about 
tradition in other places and in other disciplines. Even as Islamic thought was being studied 
through the binary of tradition and reform through the mid 20th century, within the wider 
discipline of history, historians had started challenging the idea of tradition as unchanging, 
monolithic and timeless. The much-quoted Hobsbawm and Ranger volume The Invention of 
Tradition (1983) pointed out the recent creation of many traditions. But more significant than 
this recognition that many ‘traditional’ practices were of recent manufacture, was the 
realization that modernity could not be defined without creating for it a particular past from 
which to distinguish it. That is, a tradition of the past had to be invented to act as a foil for all 
that modernity brought and to clarify what modernity entailed.  
In part, this recognition of the role of tradition in enlightenment thought and its 
definition of European modernity has been the result of postcolonial critiques and their 
questions regarding the conflation of reform with modernity (Asad 1993, 2003, 2015; 
Chatterjee, 1994; Chakarabarty, 2000, 2003). Post-colonial critique has made a concentrated 
push against the definition of modernity as a uniquely European experience that relegated the 
rest of the world to what Chakrabarty (2000:8) has aptly called ‘the waiting room of history”; 
of capitalism as the West’s self-generated and self-sustained revolution divorced of its 
relationship to colonialism (Prakash 1996; Mignolo 1999) and of categories of analysis that 
have claimed universal application without adequately demonstrating their ability to move 
beyond a European provenance. All of this has led to the recognition of the multiplicity of 
ways in which traditions, particularly intellectual traditions, and modernity may be 
intertwined. What emerges, also, is a clear sense that it is crucial to separate modernity as a 
period, from modernity as a project for the non-western world to emulate. 
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Building directly or indirectly on post-colonial theory, a generation of scholars in 
Anglo-American academia has over the last two decades engaged with Islamic thought and 
thinkers with greater subtlety (Al-Azmeh 1993; Brown, 1996; Euben, 1999; Zaman, 2002; 
Browers, 2006; Devji, 2007). Thinkers who had been labelled resistant to change by 
orientalist scholars such as Bernard Lewis, as well as by Islamic modernists such as Fazlur 
Rehman, were reconsidered as creative, if critical, interlocutors with European modernity. 
Those labelled as fundamentalist have been recognized as pursuing reform but without 
accepting the conceptual hegemony of Western categories of analysis.7. This recent body of 
scholarship has been concerned primarily with demonstrating that many revivalists and 
‘fundamentalists’ are not traditionalists in the sense of resisting change, as had been assumed 
by a previous generation of scholars. It has also successfully opened up the category of the 
modern to include a wider range of members. This scholarship has highlighted the long 
running engagement with new modes of thought, categories of analysis, and political realities 
that Islamic as well as Islamist political thinking has entailed in the last two centuries8. Yet, 
one lacuna in this scholarship is that tradition remains under-conceptualized.  
In the case of Islam there have also been differently inflected debates across different 
disciplines. When anthropologists came across the diversity of ideas and practices observed 
under the banner of Islam they either relegated them to “little traditions” (as opposed to 
“great traditions” of script-based ideas and practices based on the schema proposed by Robert 
Redfield in 1956), or abandoned this classification altogether, asserting that there is no one 
Islam to study and observe. This was, as mentioned earlier, in tension with conversations in 
other disciplines such as history and religious studies, where scholars of Islamic 
jurisprudence and political ideas attempted to identify the key concepts that held Islam 
together over the many centuries. The only unifying feature across the different disciplines 
was the suspicion that Islam remained ‘traditional’ in the modern age.  
	   11	  
It is within this context that the cultural anthropologist and post-colonial theorist Talal 
Asad argued that Islam needs to be viewed as a ‘discursive tradition’ and separated from 
questions of modernity (Asad, 2009).  
“…[O]ne needs to recognize that when one talks about tradition, one should be 
talking about, in a sense, a dimension of social life and not a stage of social 
development. In an important sense, tradition and modernity are not really two 
mutually exclusive states of a culture or society but different aspects of historicity.”9  
Asad argues that we speak of the liberal tradition, not as a stage of development, but as a 
body of ideas and practices which has its roots in European history10. Asad’s argument is not 
that liberalism is a mix of the traditional and the modern, but that it is a tradition that is 
central to modernity. Thus, he suggests we may envision a tradition as a broad vocabulary of 
ideas and practices, which constrain and inspire adherents at any given moment in history 
without precluding different arrangements in other times and places. In doing so, Asad 
resolves, or at least moves past, the question of the great and little tradition, and also the idea 
of many Islams. Islam emerges in Asad’s work (1993, 2003, 2015) as a capacious vocabulary 
that is as modern as any other, even as it carries within it medieval and pre-modern ideas.  
More interestingly for our purposes here, the closer focus on the relationship between 
thought and practice that Asad insists on, allows more fruitful ways of engaging with 
histories of political thought beyond the text11. Asad argues, like Alasdair Macintyre12, whose 
ideas on tradition were useful for Asad, that the dichotomy between thought and practice is a 
product of a particular European history but one that is not helpful in understanding either. 
One reason why Asad disputes the thought/practice dichotomy is because it renders analysis 
more susceptible to bypassing questions of power13. Implicit in this particular criticism is an 
aspect of his larger critique of liberalism as a tradition unmoored from its religious origins 
and unable to recognize its contradictions because of that disconnect14.  
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Thus, we now have an expanded notion of traditions, and of Islamic tradition in 
particular, not as the deadweight of the past, but as systems of thought and practice that 
include both method and sensibility, with a symbiotic relationship between knowledge 
production and its consumption, and which can sustain debate, difference and questioning 
without being overcome and transformed completely by them15. Reform and revision is not 
the sole preserve of the modern but an integral part of sustaining a tradition. The recent work 
of scholars like Hallaq (2103; 2009; 2001), Khaduri (1984) and Zaman (2002; 2012) have 
given us an understanding of debate, discussion, reform and retrenchment that has been a part 
of both the classical and modern Islamic tradition. Moreover, the assumption that modern 
Muslim revivalism is inspired only by Wahabism16 or only as a reaction to colonial 
imposition flies in the face of the immense diversity of inspirations and ideas with which 
Muslim revivalists have engaged.  
To lend more depth to this claim, we might take another look at South Asian Muslim 
revivalists. Despite the characterization of this late 19th and early 20th century as a period of 
intellectual decay and the ulama (Islamic scholars and jurists) as a parasitical class who foster 
this decay by Muslims modernists and orientalist scholars, it was a period of extraordinary 
creativity and debate among religious scholars who engaged with colonial conditions but also 
built directly or indirectly upon the pre-colonial reform movement of Shah Waliullah (1703-
1762)17 in Delhi [Lelyvand, 1978; Metcalf (1982), Gilmartin (1988), Sanyal (2005)]. Indeed, 
South Asia in particular has been home to significant creativity within the Islamic tradition, 
in terms of schools of thought (Deobandi18, Barelwi19), organizational arrangements (Tablighi 
Jamaat20) syncretic approaches to Islamic learning across the Shia-Sunni divide (Farangi 
Mahal21) and an engagement with non-Abrahamic faiths such as Hindu and Buddhist 
traditions (see	  Gilmartin and Lawrence, 2000). Yet all of these innovations were carried out 
within the framework of reviving and rejuvenating the tradition. From the Islamist Maududi 
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to the pietist Mohammed Ilyas, the nationalist alim Abul Kalam to the socialist Maulana 
Bhashani and even the modernist Fazlur Rehman, revivalists have been working through 
different calibrations of method and sensibility to reinvigorate the tradition. It is particularly 
useful to recognize that modernists like Fazlur Rehman, Amir Ali and Syed Ahmed Khan 
were also looking to revive Islam and engaged deeply with it despite their criticism of the 
‘traditionalists’22. Their effort was focused primarily on extracting the sensibility or an 
essence from the tradition, or to expand the repertoire of methods, but it was never a 
complete rejection of both. Thus, Islamic reform cannot be understood in opposition to 
tradition. Moreover, it is not just triggered by colonialism or as a reaction to modernity. 
Instead, Islamic revivalism in the modern period has been a multifaceted, creative, more than 
two-century-long engagement with the question of the perfect balance between method and 
sensibility given new modes of governance and social organization.  
 
Javed Ahmed Ghamidi: Tradition and Method 
In this section I bring more depth to the discussion above by elaborating the calibration of 
method and sensibility in Javed Ahmed Ghamidi’s thought, and by indicating how a dramatic 
focus on one aspect (in Ghamidi’s case, on method) has the potential to limit the vibrancy of 
debate. In English-language media coverage of Ghamidi’s work, he is generally proclaimed 
as a liberal thinker, a designation Ghamidi has never appropriated for himself23. It is pertinent 
to point out at this early stage that Ghamidi’s rise to prominence is tarnished, at least partially, 
through an association with military dictatorship in Pakistan and America’s war of terror in 
the region. The wars in Afghanistan, and Iraq, and an associated program of promoting 
secularism, and somewhat paradoxically, ‘traditionalist’ thought24, in Muslim countries often 
at the cost of democracy, played out in Pakistan with US support for the military dictatorship 
of General Musharaf for close to 11 years. One of the key publicly provided reasons for 
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Western support for Musharaf’s regime was its perceived value as a bulwark against religious 
fundamentalism in the region. Obligingly, Musharaf instituted a program of “Enlightened 
Moderation”25 which entailed, among other primarily discursive overtures against religious 
fundamentalism, the appointment of Ghamidi as a member of the Council for Islamic 
Ideology26. Some commentators have implied opportunism27 on Ghamidi’s part due to the 
elision of his ideas against Islamism with the General’s regime. Critics have argued that he is 
not really an alim (a religiously trained scholar) or even a believer (Japanwala, 2008:17). 
Such criticism raised implicit and explicit questions about his appointment to the 
constitutional body. However, prior to his appointment, Ghamidi had already established a 
significant public presence for himself through his TV shows, regular writings and the 
publication exegetical works: Al-Burhan (The Proof) and Al-Mizan (The Scales). Ghamidi’s 
television program Deen aur Danish (Religious Perspective and Reason) was immensely 
popular among urban, educated and upper class audiences28.  
Ghamidi’s hesitation in appropriating the mantel of a liberal Islamic reformer 
indicates his desire to be seen to be transforming the tradition from within. Without implying 
strategic positioning on Ghamidi’s part, it is important to recognize that his intellectual effort 
coincides with an international interest in what is being called ‘traditionalist’ Islamic thought, 
that entails an attempt at outmanoeuvring the Islamists by claiming greater authenticity for 
ideas opposed to theirs29. Of course, these US led attempts at managing Islamic discourse to 
produce less political and militant versions of Islam are not seamlessly translated from 
intention to effect (Aziz, 2011; Mahmood, 2006). It is useful to recognize and appreciate the 
internal dynamics that couple with such hegemonic attempts to produce new constellations of 
ideas. Indeed, many of the new traditionalists view themselves as building on epistemological 
premises more sophisticated than the modernists and are trying to rethink the shift in 
emphasis towards ‘modernizing Islam’ brought about by an earlier generation of reformers 
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(Kersten, 2014). Yet, at the very least, this international political-intellectual context provides 
salience to their ideas and often an international audience that continues to imagine Islamic 
reformism as a recent endeavour30.  
Within this context Javed Ahmed Ghamidi follows a particular path opened up by his 
teacher31, Maulana Islahi (1904-1997) and Islahi’s mentor Maulana Farahi (1863-1930), but 
brings an intensity to the question of method that is much more dramatic than either of his 
erstwhile teachers ever imagined. Farahi and Islahi were both brilliant scholars, trained in 
what has been called the ‘traditional’ mode of education, which refers primarily to being 
educated at a madrasah. Islahi was a student of Farahi at the Madrassa-e-Islah (hence the 
name “Islahi,” i.e, “of Islah”) established by Maualana Farahi.  Moving beyond the simplistic, 
sharp dichotomy between traditional and modern education often associated with madaris, it 
is useful to recognize that Maulana Farahi studied Arabic poetry in Lahore with Maualana 
Fayz-al-Hassan Saharanpuri (1816-1887) and then moved to Aligarh University, the seat of 
Muslim modernist thought (Lelyvand, 1978) where he engaged closely with the German 
orientalist Jozef Horowitz (1874-1931) and somewhat less enthusiastically with the English 
orientalist Sir Thomas Walker Arnold (1864-1930)32. Farahi also had the experience of 
traveling in the Persian Gulf with the then British Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon, in 190333 as 
a scholar with command over Persian, Arabic and English languages. On setting up madrassa 
Islah, Maulana Farahi brought these, and a diverse range of other influences to bear on the 
curriculum as well as the general organization.  
That Farahi, like his friend Shibli Nomani, was first a poet and philosopher was 
reflected in the curriculum of the madrassa that he set up in Siharanpur in North India. There 
was a strong emphasis on Arabic literature in particular and an exploration of the 
philosophical principles in Quran. He used pre-Islamic Arabic poetry and literature as a guide 
to understanding the meanings and implications of words used in the Quran. He read 
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mythical accounts, historiographical explanations and maps with equal interest to appreciate 
the references made in the Quran. And finally, he read some contemporary European 
philosophical literature.  One of his key works, a critique of the work of Al-Jurjani, the 11th 
century Persian scholar of Arabic rhetoric and metaphorical language, is linked to his critique 
of Greek philosophy in Islam. Writing in Arabic, he wrote for, by his own admission, only an 
audience of other ulema, that is, scholars like him.  Farahi’s key innovation was to insist upon 
an organizing principle, an order—a nazm—in the breakdown of Quranic verses and chapters.  
Amin Ahsan Islahi, one of the many brilliant scholars who flocked to Farahi’s 
madrassa, worked primarily as a journalist34 after completing his studies. In 1922 Islahi 
returned to the madrasah on Farahi’s request and took up an extended study of the Quran 
with Farahi. Soon after he also started teaching at the madrassa. Building on his teacher’s 
work, Islahi further developed his approach to systematizing the study of Quran. Moreover, 
building on his training in medieval Arabic poetry that he received from his teacher Farahi 
(who in turn had been taught by one of the pre-eminent scholars of pre-Islamic Arabic poetry 
Maulana Fayz-ul-Hassan Saharanpuri at the Anglo-Oriental College in Lahore in the 1830s) 
Islahi suggested that Quranic verses need to be interpreted in accordance with Arabic poetic 
norms of Mohammed’s period. For instance, if there is confusion about multiple meanings of 
a word, then the meaning used most commonly in Arabic poetry at the time of the Prophet 
Mohammed can be assumed to hold. 
Interestingly, despite Farahi and his pupil Islahi’s insistence on methodological 
continuity, Islahi was one of the few madrassa-trained ulema who lent support to the Abul 
Ala Maududi’s (1903-1979) Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami at a time when Islamism was seen 
as a grotestque innovation by the majority of ulema and none were willing to join it (Iqtidar, 
2011: 108-112). Islahi’s 19 year long association with JI has not received adequate 
assessment nor indeed is Ghamidi’s al-Mawrid institute literature quick to point out that 
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Islahi finally parted with the Jamaat-e-Islami in protest against JI’s decision to support a 
female candidate in Pakistan’s presidential elections35. Somewhat paradoxically, during the 
1960s, the CIA suspected Islahi of being a communist sympathizer (Nasr, 1996:172).  
Ghamidi, a pupil of Islahi, has followed him and has deepened that search for the 
organizing principles of Quran, and has identified seven distinct groups within which the 
Quran can be divided (2011:51-53). Moving away from Farahi’s insistence on writing in 
Arabic (Ghamidi writes in Urdu) Ghamidi has built upon Ishahi’s creative scheme for 
interpreting the Quran and Hadith (sayings of the Prophet) but proceeded beyond his teachers’ 
path to alter method dramatically and severely limit reliance on the existing fiqh (interpretive) 
literature36. This vast body of literature includes interpretive and theoretical works on sharia, 
the broad normative guidelines that are meant to underpin an Islamic society. This move is 
linked to the distinction that he wants to make between Divine guidance and its interpretation 
(Shahzad, 2001:12). Interpretation remains open to mistakes but Divine guidance is absolute 
and pure. Fiqh literature, by implication, is open to mistakes and confusion and thus not a 
reliable resource.  
Ghamidi establishes further procedures for the use of hadith (sayings of the Prophet) 
to supplement the understanding of Quran. He argues that hadith can only be taken as a 
supplementary explanation of ideas and injunctions in the Quran (2011: 64-68) and cannot be 
taken to add anything beyond what is in the Quran. More dramatically, in his bid to 
contextualize the Quran historically he has argued for an innovative use of Sunna by 
suggesting that sunna represent particular practices rather than a philosophy (2011:10, 61-64). 
Thus, hadith and sunna can only have a limited role to play in interpreting the Quran. More 
critically, while some interpretation of Quran were valid for the Prophet and Muslims around 
him to undertake at the time, they are no longer legitimate for any individual or group of 
Muslims to operationalize now. This is not because, as many have insisted before him, 
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modern statecraft and other paraphernalia of modernity did not exist then, but rather because 
having the Prophet in their midst gave the Muslim community of the time a clear advantage 
in understanding and interpreting the Quran (2011: 452). Today’s Muslims do not have such 
a clear model in front of them so they cannot be expected to do full justice to some of those 
duties.  
Building on the literary approach of Maulana Farahi, Ghamidi further argues that 
Quranic interpretation has to proceed through the application of the widely used meanings of 
Arabic terms of the time of the Quran as they are found in literary material from the period. 
In fact, he argues, classical exegesis has often misunderstood terms because the exegets have 
not understood that Quran is not a book of laws and instead is a kind of literary production 
(2011: 26-27) that needs to be approached as such keeping in mind the intricacies of the 
predominantly oral culture of the period. Applying this clearly delineated and fairly strict 
approach, Ghamidi has undertaken to overturn some previously dominant readings of Quran 
by emphasizing a different connotation or meaning to terms. 
Ghamidi methodology implies a highly restricted role for individual interpretation of 
the Quran. This is in stark contrast with Islamist parties like the Jamaat-e-Islami, which 
advocated a radical break from mediated religious practices that operated through the 
charisma and spiritual power of local ulema, sufi saints, pirs and preachers. The Islamist’s 
break from cultural practices of indirect interpretation and access appealed to a new class of 
upwardly mobile, previously lower middle class college graduates of early to mid 20th 
century, who felt that they now had the tools to interpret sharia themselves. Ghamidi speaks 
to a new generation of Muslims who have seen their parents trying to carry the burden of 
interpreting sharia for themselves, and realizing how daunting it is. Ghamidi does not take 
away the option of individual analysis and interpretation, but lays down strict rules while 
explicating strongly that those rules can only be followed by those who have immersed 
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themselves in specialized study of Arabic poetry, Quranic hermeneutics, Muslim history, and 
related subjects (2011: 19-40).  Thus, while the option for lay individuals to interpret sharia 
and Quran remains open in principle, for all intents and purposes it is not one just anybody 
can realistically pursue. This despite the fact that Ghamidi cuts out a major source of Quranic 
interpretation which is the fiqh literature.  
One important example of the implications of Ghamidi’s insistence on his specific 
method is his vision of the state. He establishes a strictly minimalist role for the state while at 
the same time exhorting Muslims to ‘fully cling to state authority in all circumstances’  
(Ghamidi, 2010: 452). The state has not just the right, but the duty to decide when to wage 
war. However, through this reasoning, the decision is, in Ghamidi’s view, taken firmly out of 
the hands of individuals. Ghamidi’s reading of ‘political sharia’ (2011: -451464) does not 
allow the state any right to pronounce some groups non-Muslims or to impose metrics of 
piety such as fasting, praying or covering their heads on its citizens. In a subtle and implicit 
way, Ghamidi is negating the state-led Islamizing initiative undertaken during the regime of a 
previous military dictator, General Zia (1977-1988) in Pakistan. Committed to 
methodological purity, Ghamidi does not question the right of the state to impose laws based 
on sharia but hollows out existing Islamic laws of their moral force. This is not an 
inadvertent move on his part, but a deeply thoughtful and nuanced one.  
His socially restrained and minimalist state is nevertheless very powerful. Ghamidi 
privileges laws of the state—even if the state is not explicitly Islamic—in a manner that is 
radical, despite his understated style. He argues that the laws in a Muslim majority state 
should be decided through achieving a consensus among the majority of the citizens (pp. 452-
455).  In fact, he argues that shura or consultation is an obligation (p.462) and no Muslim 
collectivity should be organized without this important principle enshrined in the institutions. 
Individual scholars, as well as citizens might have opposing interpretations of sharia 
	   20	  
guidelines and the state cannot impose demands for religious performance on its citizens, 
whether Muslim or non-Muslim. However, he also argues that beyond matters of religious 
observance, once established through whatever means, state laws have primacy, because any 
attempt at transforming them will lead to strife. Laws can only be changed slowly and so 
until that happens, they should be acknowledged and followed. Ulema, and all citizens, have 
the right to debate and discuss laws but their discussions, and even protests, should remain 
within the framework of laws, however tightly drawn that framework might be.  
Relationships between Muslims residing in different states cannot be on the basis of 
nation (qaum) but on the basis of brotherhood (akhuwat). He argues in his article “Islam aur 
Riyasat aik Jawabi nazaria (Islam and The State: An Alternative Perspective37) that Muslims 
are not required to give up their national identities to be Muslim but rather to cultivate a 
feeling of love towards other Muslims. That is, he argues that what the rise of sectarianism in 
Muslim countries requires is not the imposition of secularism but an Islamic counter-
narrative that binds these Muslims together but at the same time, does not undermine their 
national affiliations. Here, he counters the idea of ummah that Islamists have used by arguing 
that it should not be made to compete directly with national identities and Muslims should 
engage embrace fully life in whichever state they find themselves in as long as that state does 
not impose a heavy burden on them.  
With these arguments Ghamidi has used a strict hermeneutic methodology to come to 
conclusions that merge smoothly with the liberal conception of state with its emphasis on 
legality, evolutionary change and secular nationalism. Similarly, he has articulated a critique 
of individualized actions as jihad that is particularly pertinent to concerns about radicalisation 
within the context of the ongoing and continuously intensifying war on terror. In his reading 
of the rights of religious minorities as well as the rights of women, Ghamidi privileges a 
human rights conception. Mohammed Khalid Masud, a noted scholar, like Ghamidi a student 
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of Maulana Islahi, and a one-time chair of the Council of Islamic Ideology, has rightly 
suggested that Ghamidi’s key innovation is to bring a human rights approach into Islamic 
discourse without referring directly to the concept or terminology of human rights (Masud, 
2007). Indeed, as discussed above, Javed Ghamidi makes no direct reference to sources other 
than Quran and Sunna, avoiding the more widely used sources of hadith and established fiqh 
literature. Moreover, despite his repeated references to Allama Iqbal, the South-Asian poet 
philosopher as an inspiration for his attempts at the ‘reconstruction’ of Islamic thought, 
Ghamidi does not explicitly own cosmopolitan sources in the way that Iqbal did. Iqbal, the 
poet-philosopher of late colonial India (1877-1938) acknowledged influences as diverse as 
the South Asian poet Hali, the German philosophers Nietzsche and Hegel, the Irish novelist 
Joyce, and the Persian poet Hafiz.  
It is important to Ghamidi that in his exegetical texts and commentaries he follows the 
strict methodology he has defined and claims is the true rendition of the Islamic tradition38.  
Ghamidi’s intense focus on method that excludes the use of fiqh and maintains a strict focus 
only on the Quran based on the systematization he has devised, can be seen as a long running 
conversation with the modernist reformers who showed a disregard for method, such as the 
modernist Amir Ali who advocated privileging “the spirit above the letter” of Islamic 
tradition (Binder, 1957: 387). More critically, the invisible but palpable presence in all of 
Ghamidi’s writings is the Islamist Maududi, Ghamidi’s one-time teacher and mentor. In 
many respects, Ghamidi’s thought is a deep engagement with and criticism of Maududi’s 
ideas. However, in inverting the balance towards method, privileging the text alone, he shifts 
the emphasis to a narrower conception of tradition in two important ways. Interesting and 
important sources of analysis such as the fiqh literature are left without a convincing role in 
the tradition. And second, the sensibility of accommodating ambiguities and difference that 
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he also acknowledges is an important aspect of the tradition loses its capacious contradictions 
through this dependence upon a very narrow range of sources.  
Thus, Ghamidi’s method eliminates the recognition of the significant debate and 
discussion that has existed in fiqh and related literature on the relationship between state and 
law (sharia vs. qanun debates). A defining aspect of sharia in all the years of Islamic history, 
and indeed its strength, has been in social self-enforcement rather than through the state 
(Hallaq, 2013; Agrama 2010; Gilmartin 1988; Khaduri 1984; Moumtaz n.d.;). Ghamidi 
undermines the state’s right to enforce sharia without consultation and democratic checks, 
but as the discussion above shows he also paradoxically establishes the conceptual 
supremacy of the state to enforce sharia as law. Moreover, he shies away from a critical 
engagement with how precisely the state has transformed in the modern period. Instead he 
takes as given the liberal conception of a state that provides the locus of majoritarian 
aspirations and governance through laws. In accepting this conceptual supremacy of the state 
without really exploring the dynamics of its institutions, the mechanisms through which a 
consultation might actually be carried, the relationships of power that may inhere in the 
modern state, Ghamidi forecloses important avenues of debate and discussion. There is for 
instance, little leeway for alternative readings once the strict rules that Ghamidi lays down are 
followed (Amin, 2012: 179-182). The emphasis on method in this instance tends towards 
greater sterility and rigidity even if undertaken with the intention of innovation. 
 
Conclusion 
My interest here is not in critiquing Ghamidi’s thought but to use the difficulty of 
categorizing his ideas within the dominant framework of traditionalists vs. 
modernists/reformists to show in more depth the problems with defining tradition on 
historicist bases. Building on the discussion of taqlid I have suggested an alternative 
	   23	  
definition of tradition that would be helpful through a clearer demarcation of the constituent 
elements of tradition in political thought more generally. Moreover, I have argued that the 
vibrancy of a tradition is a calibration of both method and sensibility; neither can exist 
without the other although individual thinkers may emphasize one over the other. Within 
modern Islamic political thought the discussion about how to achieve the perfect balance 
between the two is the primary focus of long running and wide-ranging debates rather than 
accepting or rejecting modernity. The interest in pitting traditionalists against Islamists, or 
modernists against the militants, in the current context of the war on terror not only misses 
the axes along which these debates within the Islamic tradition are aligned, but ultimately 
represents certain colonial hubris in believing that they can be turned right around to conform 
to American interests in a tradition that has a diverse range of dedicated knowledge producers 
(ulama) and a wide variety of knowledge consumers. Placing Ghamidi’s thought within the 
wider political context also highlights the changing political valence of tradition. Ultimately, 
new histories of political thought need to not only contend with new sources and resources, 
but more importantly, they need to redefine terms of use to engage meaningfully with a wider 
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7 See in particular Euben’s (1997) very helpful discussion of the Egyptian Islamist thinker 
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10 While it useful to think through the precise religious lineage of some central liberal ideas 
as Asad does, it is important also to be wary of assuming that liberalism was generated 
entirely internally within Europe. Uday Mehta (1999) and Buck Morss (2009) among others 
have shown how integral experiences and ideas from American and Asian colonies were in 
formulating liberal ideas.  
11 In questioning the thought/practice dichotomy one of Asad’s interests was in critiquing the 
textualization of Muslim social life but at the same time, this critique opens up, I believe, 
avenues for political theorists to grapple with resources beyond texts. In the case of Javed 
Ahmed Ghamidi his TV shows cannot be seen as providing the platform for readymade ideas 
but in fact, the mechanisms through which ideas are given shape, thought through and related 
to everyday life. New histories of political thought must contend with new sources and 
resources beyond texts.  
12 MacIntyre (2011:72) treats the theory of emotivism “not only as a philosophical analysis 
but also as a sociological hypothesis.” He goes on to elaborate that he is unhappy about 
having to put the matter in this way because it remains unclear “how any adequate 
philosophical analysis in this area could escape being also a sociological hypothesis, and vice 
versa”.  
13 As Anjum (2007: 652) points out: “ The consideration of the power of political, economic 
and social motivation, in Asad, is tempered with attention to the power of faith, conviction, 
nostalgia  or superstition…..Such an attention makes possible the meeting of the discipline of 
Islamology and history on the one hand, and anthropology and political economy on the 
other.” 
14 Over the last two decades, Asad has painstakingly assembled the many pieces of these 
religious origins in the liberal traditions- from questions of pain, agency, memory, violence, 
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to the human and the secular. He has also detailed the ways in which they have been 
unhinged in contemporary liberal tradition. 
15 Daniel Brown (1996:3) suggests a useful image to think about the relationship between 
tradition and modernity inverting the Enlightenment conception of tradition as darkness 
illuminated by modernity. Rather he suggests we should think about tradition as a beam of 
light and modernity as a prism through which tradition is refracted. “A tradition emerges 
from the prism of modernity as a multi-coloured spectrum of responses. Some responses will 
show the effects of modernity more dramatically than others, but none will be entirely 
untouched.” 
16 Wahabism is the movement inspired by the 18th century Arabian reformer Moahmmed Ibn 
al Abdul Wahab who argued for an austere version of Islam.   
17 Jalbani (1967) for an overview of Waliullah’s teachings 
18 A school of thought that took strands from Wahabi reformism but tempered them with a 
continuous engagement with Sufism and a systematic approach to Islamic teaching.  
19 Predominantly with non-Wahabi ulama who also support sufi practices 
20 Mass proselytizing and pietist group that is the largest grouping of Muslims today.  
21 18th Century madrassa bringing together Shia and Sunni scholarship.  
22 For instance, despite Rahman’s criticism of the traditionalists he did not advocate an 
abandonment of the tradition. Moreover, he remained fascinated by and interested in 
resources for revival from pre-modern reform movements (Moosa (2000:10). As Leigh Jenco 
(n.d.) has suggested for late 19th and early 20th century Chinese reformers, for many of the 
Muslims modernists the contours of modernity were not sharply defined nor had they taken 
an inevitable shape beyond the tradition. They did not envision leaving the tradition behind 
when they incorporated specific ideas into their repertoires. On the contrary they saw their 
work as expanding the tradition.  
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23 See for instance What is Liberal Islam?  In Friday Times, a Pakistani newspaper: 
(http://www.thefridaytimes.com/beta2/tft/blog.php?blogstory=4 ) and  ‘Islamic Scholar 
Attacks Pakistan’s Blasphemy Laws’ in the UK based Guardian 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/20/islam-ghamidi-pakistan-blasphemy-laws . 
Ghamidi claims that he is “neither Islamist nor secular…” but “…a Muslim and a democrat”.  
24 The support for traditional Islam is wide-ranging including encouragement of Sufism, as a 
form of Islamic mysticism that represents a non-political interpretation of Islam. According 
to the NY Times, “[T]he United States, meanwhile, sees Sufi Islam as a counter force to 
terrorism, and has helped promote it by giving more than $1.5 million since 2001 on the 
restoration and conservation of Sufi shrines in 
Pakistan.”(http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/06/the-islam-that-hard-liners-hate/?_r=0 ) 
25 Given the importance of international allies for legitimizing Musharaf’s regime his article 
launching ‘Enlightened Moderation’ was quite appropriately published in the Washington 
Post. Musharaf, Pervez, “A Plea for Enlightened Moderation” The Washington Post, June 1, 
2004. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A5081-2004May31.html (last 
accessed Oct 23, 2013) 
26 Council of Islamic Ideology is a constitutional body that is tasked with ensuring that all 
laws formulated by the Parliament are in accordance with Islam. Such a broad remit brings 
with it relatively little power towards enforcement.  
27 See Aziz (2011). However, Aziz has also argued convincingly that placing him merely as a 
puppet in Musharaf’s campaign does not recognize the limits placed by the demands of 
Ghamidi’s hermeneutic approach.  
28 Even while in exile, Ghamidi has returned to Pakistani television screens since 2014 with a 
program “Ghamidi kay sath” (With Ghamidi) recorded in Dubai with a live audience in 
Karachi asking questions through a video link. Finally, in addition to his international tours to 
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UK, USA and Australia (see his website http://www.javedahmadghamidi.com/) Javed 
Ghamidi sends out his thoughts to his international followers on twitter and through facebook.  
29 A Rand Corporation publication (Benard, 2004) lays out the following program for the 
support of traditionalists: “The West should support the traditionalists against the 
fundamentalists in these ways: 
• Publicize traditionalist criticism of fundamentalist violence and extremism. 
• Encourage disagreements between traditionalists and fundamentalists. 
• Discourage alliances between traditionalists and fundamentalists. 
• Encourage cooperation between modernists and reformist traditionalists. 
• Where appropriate, educate the traditionalists to debate the fundamentalists. 
Fundamentalists are often rhetorically superior, while traditionalists practice a politically 
inarticulate "folk Islam." In places such as Central Asia, traditionalists may need to be 
trained in orthodox Islam to be able to stand their ground against fundamentalists. 
• Increase the presence and profile of modernists in traditionalist institutions.” 
30One way in which this notion manifests itself is through call for a reformation in Islam. See 
Mehdi Hassan’s piece for an overview of some of these calls as well as his hard hitting 
response https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/may/17/islam-reformation-
extremism-muslim-martin-luther-europe (accessed July 23, 2016) 
31 Ghamidi has a BA in English Literature from Lahore ‘s Government College and only 
started his apprenticeship with Maulana Islahi in his twenties after his initial introduction to 
the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami and its founder Maududi.  Initially, Ghamidi had a close 
relationship with both Maududi and Islahi, but over time his pupilage with Islahi deepend and 
when Islahi left JI, Ghamidi followed suit soon after. 
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32(Islahi n.d:10) Thomas Walker Arnold later became a Professor of Islamic Studies at SOAS 
from 1921-1930, and was one of the editors of the first edition of Brill’s Encyclopeadia of 
Islam.  
33 (Islahi, n.d.: 11) is not sure about the dates. His estimate for the state visit with Lord 
Curzon is for 1900 but other records show that to have been 1903.  
34 At a period of great enthusiasm about the possibilities of print technology among Muslims 
of South Asia, Islahi’s intellectual career follows a pattern common to many other prominent 
Muslim thinkers of the time. By late 19th century several key trends had to emergence of print 
as a very popular medium and to a boom in religious writings. By the 1870s editions of the 
Quran and other religious books were selling in tens of thousands in North India. In the same 
period, over seven hundred newspapers and magazines were launched in Urdu, the language 
associated primarily with Muslims of North India (Robinson, 1993: 67). Journalism became a 
career for many Islamic scholars, or ulama, the loosely organized and broadly meritocratic 
group of knowledge producers in the Islamic tradition who brought their historical and 
philosophical learning together with their skills in rhetoric and writing. 
35 During the 1965 presidential elections in Pakistan, Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami under 
Mawdudi supported Ms. Fatima Jinnah as a consensus candidate in its alliance with leftist 
groups against the then military dictator Gen. Ayub (1958-69). Islahi broke away from JI 
declaring that he could not participate in this opportunistic alliance that undermined JI’s 
previous acceptance of sharia interpretations against a woman leader. 
36 Saleem Shahzad, a long time associate of Ghamidi’s and translator of many of his works in 
English, points out in the Translator’s note at the beginning of the English copy of Mizan that 
(p.12) “The shariah portion of this book has been entirely cleansed of fiqh. It is based purely 
on the author’s understanding of divine law.” 
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37  http://jang.com.pk/jang/jan2015-daily/22-01-2015/col10.htm (last accessed 25 January 
2016).  
38However, if we move our analysis away from his texts, and to his television appearances 
Ghamidi engages with much more wide ranging sources bringing in many different kinds of 
thinkers and their arguments. In this short clip (http://admin.samaa.tv/ghamidi-ke-saath/07-
Feb-2015/ghamidi-ke-saath-07-feb-2015-samaa-tv) for instance, he refers to Hegel and Marx 
to argue against political revolution while supporting at the same time an intellectual 
revolution (fikri inquilab).  
 
